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The Paris Agreement: The future relevance of 
UNFCCC-backed  carbon markets for Africa
Axel Michaelowa, Sandra Greiner, Stephan Hoch, Fabrice Le Saché, Dario Brescia, Hilda Galt, Sebastian 
Mayr, El-Hadj Mbaye Diagne
The Paris Agreement in brief: 
focus on carbon markets
The Paris Climate Change Conference was held 
from 29 November to 13 December 2015 in Par-
is, France. It served as the 21st Conference of 
the Parties to the UN Framework Convention 
on Climate Change (UNFCCC) (COP 21) and 
the 11th Conference of the Parties serving as the 
Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol 
(KP) (CMP 11). The challenging task of the Paris 
Conference was to decide on a universal interna-
tional climate policy agreement for the time after 
the second commitment period of the KP ends in 
Key Messages
• A fresh start for international climate policy: 
The Paris Agreement removes policy uncer-
tainty and ensures that carbon market mech-
anisms will continue to be an important part 
of the multilateral climate regime after 2020. 
These mechanisms will evolve along two lines: 
one with strong international oversight (SDM) 
and one with a more bilateral character (coop-
erative approaches, CAs). Africa would benefit 
if the SDM becomes quickly operationalized, 
building on the modalities and procedures of 
the CDM and taking into consideration im-
portant reform elements and lessons learned 
for Africa. In this context, it is crucial that ex-
isting CDM projects will be permitted to be 
transferred to the new SDM. Africa should 
also demand that the CAs are subject to strin-
gent international rules in order to prevent a 
race to the bottom and subsequent crowding 
out of the SDM. Finally, the adaptation levy 
should also be placed on internationally trans-
ferred mitigation outcomes (ITMOs) rather 
than burdening only the SDM.
• Not words only but action: High ambition 
coalition members and industrialized countries 
supporting market mechanisms in Paris need 
to generate demand for CERs and ITMOs 
well before 2020. This should entail provisions 
that would provide investment certainty to Af-
rican projects with high sustainable develop-
ment co-benefits. 
• Continued CDM reform: PoA rules are be-
coming more and more manageable for African 
entities. Linkages of CDM to climate finance 
institutions including the GCF are envisaged 
but require constant pushing by developing 
country negotiators.
• Create post-2020 public CER demand and 
investment certainty: African negotiators 
should push industrialized countries to quan-
tify demand for credits when converting their 
Intended Nationally Determined Contribu-
tions (INDCs) into NDCs at the signature of 
the Paris Agreement.
• The SDM should primarily work as a market 
mechanism, but also serve as a tool for re-
sults-based mitigation finance: In the latter 
case units should voluntarily be cancelled. 
22020, overcoming the failure of COP 15 in Co-
penhagen 2009 to do so. 
Due to superb diplomacy by the French hosts, the 
Paris Conference crowned its work with the adop-
tion of the Paris Agreement (PA). At first glance, 
it may seem surprising that the PA is an annex to a 
decision called “Adoption of the Paris Agreement” 
(Paris Decision, PD) that specifies the work plan 
for the next years. This structure has been select-
ed to facilitate ratification of the PA by national 
governments, especially the US. The PA will only 
enter into force upon ratification by at least 55 par-
ties, covering at least 55% of global GHG emis-
sions (Art 21.2)1. Once the PA becomes effective, 
it will be legally binding for the signatory parties. 
As for any international treaty, withdrawal is pos-
sible with one year notice (Art. 28.2).
The key elements of the PA can be summarized as 
follows:
• Surprisingly strong ambition: global tem-
perature increase is to remain “well below” 
2° and efforts are to be made to reach 1.5° C 
(Art. 2), with a global peak in GHG emissions 
to be achieved as soon as possible. A critical 
element is the specification that a balance of 
emissions by sources and removal by sinks is 
to be reached by the second half of the cen-
tury (Art 4.1). Progress towards this goal will 
be measured every 5 years, starting in 2023, 
through global stocktaking (Art. 14.1 and 2)
• Participation of all countries while follow-
ing the principle of “common but differ-
entiated responsibilities”: All countries are 
to contribute to climate change mitigation 
through Nationally Determined Contribu-
tions (NDCs)2, but the different circumstanc-
es and responsibilities of developing countries 
are highlighted, especially regarding Least 
Developed Countries  (LDCs) and Small Is-
land Developing States (SIDS). There is how-
ever no regional differentiation, i.e. no special 
treatment for Africa as a whole. The PD ac-
knowledges the huge gap between the target 
1  According to the latest national inventories. 
2  Before the Paris Conference, 65 Intended NDCs (INDCs) stated the 
intention to use market mechanisms (IETA INDC tracker (2016). Countries 
can now update the INDCs before signing the PA or can directly submit 
the current INDC to become the NDC when signing.
of the PA and the mitigation achieved if all 
NDCs are implemented in full. This means 
that the ambition of current INDCs needs to 
be strengthened as a consequence of the PA.
“The Paris Agreement is 
surprisingly ambitious, but the 
willingness of governments to 
close the mitigation gap remains 
to be seen”
• While developed countries should have abso-
lute targets, developing countries should also 
move over time towards “economy wide re-
duction or limitation targets” (Art 4.4) 
• Increasing mitigation ambition without an 
end date: Every five years from 2023 onwards, 
the NDCs are to be updated and made more 
stringent (Art. 4.3 and 4.9)
• Transparent accounting, albeit with flexibil-
ity for developing countries (Art. 13.2) and 
simplifications for LDCs and SIDS (Art. 
13.3).
Before the Paris Conference some observers were 
skeptical whether market mechanisms would at all 
be mentioned in the agreement. However, Art. 6 
provides elaborate wording on two types of coop-
erative mechanisms that shall be:
• A centrally governed mechanism (current-
ly called SDM3) that is building on existing 
features of the CDM, but can be used by all 
countries. It shall be supervised by a body 
designated by the conference of the parties to 
the PA, similar to how the Executive Board 
supervises the CDM. Public and private par-
ticipation in the SDM needs to be approved 
by Parties. The PD (para 38) makes it clear 
that the SDM directly takes up the principles 
of the CDM, such as real, measurable and 
long term reductions, additionality and verifi-
cation and certification by DOEs, and explic-
itly asks to apply experience from the Kyoto 
3  For the purpose of this policy brief, the new mechanism identified by 
the PA will be referred to as Sustainable Development Mechanism (SDM). 
This name however has been deleted from the final text. Some Parties 
question the name for its missing link to mitigation.
3Mechanisms. New features of the SDM are 
the requirement to avoid double counting and 
pursue an overall mitigation of global emis-
sions.  
• “Cooperative approaches” (CAs) that can 
generate credits (internationally transferred 
mitigation outcomes - ITMOs) are not yet 
defined in detail. Only the principles of en-
vironmental integrity and transparency are 
mentioned. Hence additional conceptual 
work and political decisions are required to 
define the framework for the CAs and also 
a more detailed definition of ITMOs. Many 
observers are of the opinion that CAs will be 
bilateral mechanisms with rather loose inter-
national oversight. If that happens, interna-
tional carbon markets would be further frag-
mented and the SDM would face probably 
ruinous competition.
The PD also urges Parties to promote the volun-
tary cancellation of CERs, already before 2020 
(para 107). In addition, urgency is given to the 
transparency of the reporting on  the use of the 
ITMOs generated by the CAs for pre-2020 ac-
tions (para 108).  
“Strong role of carbon markets in 
the post-2020 climate agreement 
has been secured and the CDM 
serves as its foundation”
Despite all its work on the long-term climate pol-
icy regime, the immediate reform of the CDM 
before 2020 has not been neglected by the Paris 
conference. In its classical guidance to the CDM 
Executive Board (EB), the CMP asks the EB to, 
inter alia:
• develop a stand-alone guidance for Pro-
grammes of Activity (PoA)4
• seek new sources of finance for CDM activi-
ties, from international institutions and espe-
cially in the GCF context
4  It refers to: a “CDM Programme of Activities standard,” a “CDM Pro-
gramme of Activities validation and verification standard,” and a “CDM 
Programme of Activities cycle procedure”; Standalone PoA documenta-
tion.
• simplify and streamline CDM procedures 
in general, including through standardized 
baselines5
• define  more cost-effective MRV approaches 
• allow the revision of methodologies without 
project specific information
• expand the scope of Regional Collaboration 
Centres work beyond pure CDM activities, 
i.e. to support development of the new mech-
anisms. 
This guidance goes further than in the last years, 
which shows that the CDM continues to evolve. 
Many of Africa’s negotiation priorities are reflect-
ed in this decision. The link of the CDM to climate 
finance is particularly important, as it may help to 
bridge the time until CER demand increases again 
as a result of stronger mitigation ambition.
With regards to LDCs, several decisions were 
taken by the CMP with relevance for the market 
mechanisms: 
• Art. 9.9 of the PA urges to define simplified 
approval procedures for LDCs and SIDS 
to coordinate and deliver resources to sup-
port country-driven strategies. Para 65 PD 
also calls for enhancing the coordination and 
delivery of resources to LDCs “through sim-
plified and efficient application and approval 
procedures”. Such resources may be used for 
capacity building for the new cooperative 
mechanisms.
5  This refers to: the project cycle, the registration and verification process, the 
development and approval of standardized baselines, the methodological stand-
ards and procedures, and the accreditation procedure.
4• Capacity building to enhance ability of 
LDCs (and other vulnerable countries) in im-
plementing long term climate change actions.
Substantial efforts will be needed to operationalize 
the general rules for market mechanisms outlined 
in the PA. In the next sections we discuss how Af-
rica can engage to generate short term demand for 
CDM activities and immediately “hit the ground 
running” when the SDM becomes operational. 
Priority actions for Africa 
in light of the results of the 
Paris conference
African countries will have to continue raising 
their voice in the international negotiation fora in 
order to benefit from the momentum generated by 
the PA.
Those African countries that so far have not done 
so in their INDC should include the use of mar-
ket mechanisms in their NDCs when signing the 
PA. This would provide a strong signal to the in-
ternational community that Africa is ready to use 
the mechanisms and could help to mobilize pre-
2020 mitigation actions (i.e. through new CDM 
investments) and to speed up the operationaliza-
tion of the SDM. African leaders should engage 
with industrialized countries that do not want to 
use market mechanisms in their INDC but de-
clared at the Paris Conference that they support 
the mechanisms, in order to achieve inclusion of 
market mechanisms in the NDCs of these coun-
tries.
Various streams of action are of great importance 
for enabling short-term mitigation actions. 
• Early action. Existing CDM activities should 
have a clear future under the PA; and coun-
tries making use of the CDM until 2020 
should have their activities recognized as ear-
ly action under the PA. For this purpose, el-
igibility criteria under which CDM activities 
would be permitted to transition to the SDM 
need to be defined.  
• CDM reform. It is crucial that the review of 
CDM Modalities & Procedures (M&P) will 
be concluded swiftly and successfully to es-
tablish the CDM as a solid building block of 
the SDM.  To unblock the current stalemate 
and avoid a proliferation of issues, African ne-
gotiators should support a minimal consensus 
and a focus on priority issues, such as the in-
clusion of PoAs, rather than a long wish list of 
detailed reform items. 
• Immediate linkage of CDM activities with 
new sources of climate finance, in particular 
the GCF. The CMP encouraged the CDM 
EB to explore opportunities for financing 
CDM projects through the GCF. This would 
provide high-quality investment mitigation 
opportunities for the GCF, while stalled 
CDM activities would benefit from a ready-
to-access source of finance. African countries 
should seek new approaches for successfully 
channelling GCF finance into CDM activ-
ities well before 2020, inter alia by pushing 
for direct acquisition of CERs by the GCF. 
Moreover, innovative sources of climate fi-
nance could be tested in conjunction with 
CDM activities such as green bonds, low car-
bon equity funds or loan guarantees.
• CDM as MRV tool. Promote the use of 
CDM methodologies for calculating emis-
sions reductions for other mitigation initi-
atives supported with international climate 
finance. This increases comparability across 
mechanisms, and lowers transaction costs for 
host countries, as they do not need to apply 
different results indicators for mitigation im-
pacts
• New sources of demand for African carbon 
credits, through:
 üUpscaling existing public procurement 
programs such as CI-DEV, Swedish En-
ergy Agency and Nordic Environment Fi-
nance 
 üA global market-based measure (GMBM) 
in the aviation sector by 2016, which could 
generate additional demand for carbon 
credits6 as the sector aims to achieve carbon 
neutral growth and a 50% cut in emissions 
6  Annual demand is estimated to reach around 2.6 tCO2eq between 
2021-2035 (Oeko Institut 2015)
5on 2010 levels by 2050. An ICAO high lev-
el meeting on the GMBM will be held in 
May 2016, with the aim of preparing a text 
and recommendations for the 39th Session 
of the ICAO Assembly, to be held in Oc-
tober 2016.
 üStrengthening domestic uses of the CDM, 
allowing the creation of national demand 
for CERs from projects implemented inter-
nally, for instance allowing their utilization 
under a carbon tax – such as the approach 
planned in South Africa - or other carbon 
pricing initiatives, and strengthen the role 
of market mechanisms under their NDCs. 
 üVoluntary markets, exploiting the potential 
of these markets in supporting actions in 
specific sectors (e.g. REDD+ and other ac-
tivities with high sustainable development 
co-benefits) for which buyers have an in-
terest in providing support: This could also 
involve South-South transactions such as a 
credit sale from Ecosur Afrique to Volta-
cars in 20157.
 üNew international initiatives such as the 
Solar Alliance as vehicles to harness CDM. 
Making the Paris Agreement  
work for Africa in the long 
term
The Paris Agreement presents a number of oppor-
tunities for further improving the participation of 
African nations in market mechanisms. However, 
ensuring that these opportunities are not missed 
requires active African engagement in the further 
operationalization and implementation of the Par-
is Agreement. 
Firstly, African governments should continue their 
active participation in shaping the new SDM to 
ensure that it builds on the M&P of the CDM, 
and that the new mechanism reflects African 
needs and priorities. The SDM explicitly has a 
number of parallels with the existing CDM frame-
work; including the need for additionality, real and 
measurable mitigation, verification by a DOE and 
encouraging the participation of public and private 
7  http://www.ecosurafrique.com/news_release.php?id=219&f= 
entities. However, what is not yet clear is the nature 
of the relationship between these two mechanisms. 
Incorporating those ongoing CDM reforms into 
the SDM that have led to more CDM activities in 
Africa – especially PoAs – is a key priority. African 
nations should also have sufficient representation 
on the governing body, such as through having 
LDC representatives on the board (which is cur-
rently not the case for the CDM EB). The role of 
Designated National Authorities (DNAs) in ac-
counting for emission reductions achieved under 
the SDM and how these relate to NDCs should 
also be considered. Due to the risk of double 
counting, it may be that DNAs will play a more 
prominent role in the SDM than they currently do 
under the CDM. 
Secondly, African countries should ensure that 
the SDM not only serves as a generally accepted 
market mechanism with significant demand from 
industrialized countries and emerging economies, 
but also as a tool to access results-based mitiga-
tion financing. When used in the context of re-
sults-based climate finance, units generated under 
the SDM could be voluntarily cancelled. The SDM 
should thus be designed as a tool to produce highly 
credible units for various uses. 
Accounting of the units in the context of a host 
country’s NDC should however be left out of the 
modalities and procedures of the SDM. Adjusting 
the NDCs for units issued by the SDM is only 
important in the case where units are transferred 
out of the country. Then double claiming of the 
emission reductions by both the host country and 
the acquiring Party towards their NDCs has to 
be avoided. When units are voluntarily cancelled, 
however, this problem is avoided. Just like the 
CDM, the SDM should operate on the principle 
of certifying units that are additional compared to 
a stringent baseline, i.e. the most likely develop-
ment of policy instruments / emissions of a sector 
in the host country. The baselines of the NDCs are 
currently not sufficiently granular to serve as SDM 
baselines and may still contain aspirational targets 
rather than forecasting a likely development of 
emissions. 
Where units are transferred out of the country, 
the accounting challenges are the same under the 
6SDM and CAs. Hence any rules on adjusting host 
country’s NDCs for mitigation outcomes trans-
ferred internationally should apply consistently 
and be developed under the guidance for CAs. 
These issues are only vaguely defined in the PA, 
and require further analysis and negotiation in or-
der to ensure that Africa benefits adequately. 
 “The new central mechanism 
agreed in Paris opens the door 
for an evolution of the CDM, 
but needs to be supported by 
reliable demand to allow for new 
investments”
Thirdly, African negotiators should ensure that 
the SDM does not become unreasonably disad-
vantaged due to stricter requirements applying to 
the SDM than to the CAs. CAs offer the ability 
for direct bilateral engagement with (financing) 
nations and/or linking with their regional carbon 
markets but historically, bilateral schemes have 
been more focused on developed country link-
ing of emission trading schemes. Experience un-
der the Kyoto Mechanisms has shown that lack 
of international oversight is likely to lead to out-
comes that violate the principles of environmen-
tal integrity and transparency, as happened under 
Joint Implementation which was used to “launder” 
hot air. Thus CAs should be subject to binding in-
ternational rules regarding these two principles. 
Equal opportunities in accessing carbon markets 
should be awarded to activities under the SDM. It 
is a mechanism that promises to be more closely 
aligned with African interests as it is multilater-
ally governed, and should thus be operating on a 
level playing field with CAs. For example, African 
negotiators should work to ensure that a share of 
proceeds for adaptation financing is also integrated 
into the transferred ITMOs from CAs, since this 
is also applied to SDM activities. Furthermore, the 
requirement that activities under the SDM must 
contribute to an overall reduction in global emis-
sions (which some equate with net mitigation) 
while no such requirement is placed on CAs could 
be considered an unfair burden.
Recommended Actions
For the UNFCCC negotiations 
• Engage in shaping the rules for the new SDM 
and cooperative approaches, based on the les-
sons of the CDM 
 ü Integrate progress made in CDM reforms 
that have benefited Africa into the new 
SDM Transition the CDM into post-2020 
regime through developing eligibility crite-
ria for African projects to transition to the 
SDM
 üEnsure that requirements for CAs to con-
tribute to sustainable development and en-
vironmental integrity are strictly adhered to
 üEnsure that mitigation actions supported 
through the SDM or CAs using climate fi-
nance can be counted towards a host coun-
try’s NDC 
 üEnsure that CAs generate a share of pro-
ceeds for adaptation
• Explore convergence of interest between Af-
rican countries and other Parties on market 
mechanisms to increase demand 
For the restoration of demand and 
mobilization of new investments
• Provide a sufficient degree of investment cer-
tainty for carbon market project developers 
 ü Introduce long-term acquisition pro-
grammes with a clear indication of a mini-
mum value of CERs
7 üEstablish clarity on what can count as early 
action for post-2020 market mechanisms
• Link climate finance and carbon market de-
mand sources to Africa’s CDM portfolio
 üWork out practical options and establish 
precedents for funding of African CDM 
activities by climate finance institutions in 
particular the GCF
 üActively mobilize new demand sources 
such as aviation and CER cancellation be-
fore 2020 and African climate negotiators 
to engage in the discussion of ICAO
 üFollow up on the Paris declaration of the 
“friends of market mechanisms”8 to gen-
erate demand through their NDCs. This 
could be led through Senegal who is signa-
tory of this initiative
• Encourage the payment of a premium for 
high SD contributions 
• Encourage buyers to prioritize acquisition of 
credits from Africa
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